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Violent Bureaucracy: A Critical Analysis of the British Public 1 
Employment Service (2010-15) 2 
Abstract 3 
Between 2010-15, the Coalition’s pursuit of a radical austerity programme saw Britain’s 4 
Jobcentre Plus experience some of the most punitive reforms and budget cuts in its history. 5 
Focusing on the outcomes of these reforms, a growing body of research has found that 6 
claiming processes became a more ‘institutionally violent’ and injurious experience for out-7 
of-work benefit claimants. The present article draws upon ideas, developed by Bauman 8 
(1989), which focus on the processes that facilitate ‘institutional violence’. We use this 9 
framework to analyse ten interviews with front-line workers and managers in 10 
public/contractor employment services. In doing so, we expose an array of policy tools and 11 
hidden managerial methods used during the Coalition administration which encouraged 12 
front-line staff to deliver services in ways that led to a range of harmful outcomes for 13 
benefit claimants. 14 
Keywords: Employment Services; Institutional Violence; Street-level Bureaucracy; Welfare 15 
Reform 16 
Introduction 17 
In 2010, the Conservative/Liberal Democrat (‘Coalition’) government outlined a ‘radical’ 18 
austerity programme (Osborne, 2010a). This programme was designed to rescue business 19 
from the throes of an enduring North American Financial Crisis by implementing a series of 20 
unprecedented public expenditure cuts and social security reforms which redistributed 21 
power/wealth away from working class populations (Cooper and Whyte, 2017). A central 22 
feature of austerity was to galvanise political disenchantment with a comprehensive social 23 
security system. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne (2010b), declared that 24 
excessive spending on social security services and cash benefits under the previous New 25 
Labour administration had served to undermine national economic performance by 26 
‘crowding out’ investment. While the Prime Minister, David Cameron (2011), declared that 27 
social security provision had fuelled a surge in irresponsible behaviour and (under-)class 28 
cultural values including voluntary unemployment and an entitlement mentality. As such, 29 
the Coalition government pursued ‘social security austerity’ in two broad directions (Grover, 30 
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2019). On the one hand, numerous efforts were made to slash social expenditure on key 31 
services/benefits and/or channel it into new investment opportunities by increasingly 32 
exposing services to the (quasi-) private market (Finn, 2018). On the other hand, the 33 
Coalition government also built on the foundations left by their predecessors to carve out a 34 
more punitive system of employment service delivery.  35 
These reforms transformed the operational logic driving the day-to-day running of Britain’s 36 
network of public (Jobcentre Plus) and quasi-private (Work Programme) employment 37 
services. For front-line workers, reforms generally entailed delivering services with less 38 
resource, more focus on moving people off benefit as quickly as possible, and minimising 39 
the costs of fraud and error (Finn, 2018:226). Meanwhile, for those claiming out-of-work 40 
benefits, reforms generally meant undertaking more compulsory work-related duties in 41 
exchange for fiscal support far below the income necessary to meet basic needs (Fletcher 42 
and Wright, 2018). Failure to perform such duties to an agreed standard would also 43 
potentially result in a disqualification from benefit under the rubric of an ‘enhanced 44 
sanctioning regime’ (Adler, 2018).  45 
To legitimise these reforms, concerted efforts were made by politicians and the media to 46 
cultivate an increasingly hostile socio-political climate; framing Britain’s poor people as a 47 
central threat to national security (Tyler, 2020). A plethora of classed and racialized groups 48 
(migrant, unemployed, disabled persons) became the prime antagonists of various 49 
pejorative discourses emphasising top-down processes of stigmatisation to garner public 50 
support for welfare reform. Hostilities of this kind—emerging from above and manifesting 51 
on the ground, relationally, in everyday social interplay (cf. Burnett, 2017:220)—promoted 52 
expenditure cuts and punitive social security reforms as the only logical policy response to 53 
simultaneously restore competitive economic conditions and manage the perceived 54 
threat(s) of capriciously defined social ‘others’ (Tyler, 2020).  55 
A growing body of research has found that benefit claiming processes became a more 56 
physically and psychologically injurious experience for out-of-work populations under social 57 
security austerity. Batty et al.’s (2015) survey of 1,013 homelessness service users in 2015 58 
found the enhanced sanctioning regime disproportionately affected those with poor mental 59 
health, drug/alcohol dependency issues and poor literacy; leading to rough sleeping, 60 
hunger, exacerbating mental health issues and increasing foodbank usage. After conducting 61 
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interviews with 481 benefit claimants between 2014 and 2017, the Welfare Conditionality 62 
(2018) project concluded that post-2010 reforms increased poverty/destitution, 63 
exacerbated ill health and facilitated movements into survival crime and/or off-benefit. The 64 
Department for Work and Pensions (hereafter DWP) carried out internal ‘peer reviews’ of 65 
49 benefit claimant deaths between 2012 and 2014, finding ‘that in ten cases the claimant 66 
had had their benefits sanctioned’ (Pring, 2017:54). Between 2010-2014, statistics show that 67 
over 9,000 benefit claimants died and an additional 725,000 anti-depressant prescriptions 68 
were administered after they were declared ‘fit-to-work’ or their benefit was made 69 
conditional on participation in work-preparation groups—with a number of these deaths 70 
being ‘publically attributed by family and friends to the removal of benefits by the DWP’ 71 
(Clifford, 2020:158; Mills, 2018; DWP, 2015; Ryan, 2019). 72 
The present article seeks to explain how ordinary people carrying out their daily duties in 73 
employment service offices were able to implement cruel and inhumane social security 74 
reforms by drawing upon Bauman’s (1989) theory of ‘institutional violence’. We contend 75 
that it is crucial to situate this behaviour in the context of policy and practice changes which 76 
have encouraged the production and delivery of ‘institutional violence’ on the front-line. 77 
Drawing upon interviews with ten front-line workers and managers in public and quasi-78 
private employment services, the authors expose an array of policy tools and hidden 79 
managerial methods that were used during the Coalition administration (2010-2015); 80 
encouraging front-line workers to deliver service in ways which led to a range of harmful 81 
outcomes for benefit claimants.  82 
From Outcomes to Processes of Institutional Violence: The Social 83 
Production of Moral Invisibility  84 
'Institutional violence' originated out of Galtung's (1969) germinal efforts to broaden the 85 
narrow conception of violence. Rather than understanding violence solely as a phenomenon 86 
that occurs interpersonally and involves an exertion of force by an actor who intends to 87 
inflict harm on another; Galtung (1969) argues that violence is also impersonal, produced 88 
and distributed within the power structures and institutions that govern societies. From this 89 
perspective, violence is present in ‘avoidable’ situations where the monopolisation of 90 
‘insight and/or resources’ by a group or class excludes another group(s) or class(es) from the 91 
resources and/or recognition necessary to realise their capabilities to the same extent 92 
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(Galtung, 1969:169). Violence in this sense can be exercised even if there are no concrete 93 
perpetrators directly attacking others—it occurs ‘indirectly’ and ‘silently’ (Galtung, 94 
1969:171; 173). His ideas have since been applied and developed in relation to a plethora of 95 
social injustices; ranging from slavery and racism, to poverty and gender inequalities 96 
(Farmer, 2004). 97 
Academics have drawn inspiration from Galtung’s broader notion of violence in efforts to 98 
make sense of ‘social security austerity’ in Britain. Grover (2019) conceptualises post-2010 99 
social security changes as a form of ‘violent proletarianisation’. He (2019:338-339) 100 
concludes that reforms led to ‘avoidable physical and mental diswelfares’; primarily by 101 
forcing claimant groups off benefit and/or into precarious wage labour in ways that ‘socially 102 
murdered’ some of Britain’s most vulnerable individuals through penury and suicide. 103 
Relatedly, Wright, Fletcher and Stewart (2020) view this as a form of ‘social abuse’; 104 
concluding that ‘Jobcentres have become more dangerous places’ as reforms ‘often caused 105 
symbolic and material suffering’ which ‘sometimes had life-threatening effects’. Meanwhile, 106 
Cooper and Whyte’s (2017:23; 2018:5) edited collection conceptualises post-2010 reforms 107 
as ‘institutional violence’. They argue that reforms have not only ‘delivered acute physical 108 
and psychological harms’ which ‘routinely and over time deteriorate[d]…mental and 109 
physical health’, but they were ‘organised and administered through legitimate means’. 110 
That is, by ‘smartly dressed…armies of civil servants’ and ‘private officials sitting behind 111 
desks’ in public-facing bureaucracies. 112 
Whilst the concept of ‘institutional violence’ has received a number of critiques (cf. Grover, 113 
2019; Wright, Fletcher and Stewart, 2020), for present purposes, the main shortcoming of 114 
both Galtung’s work and subsequent applications of ‘institutional violence’ is that authors 115 
focus overwhelmingly on outcomes and not on processes (Gupta, 2012:20). For example, 116 
while Cooper and Whyte (2017:3;2018:5) profess to ‘identify precisely how particular public 117 
and private organisations have delivered acute physical and psychological harm’; we 118 
contend insufficient attention is paid to the ‘how’ and that their edited collection instead 119 
proceeds to focus predominantly on the many violent outcomes fuelled by austerity driven 120 
policies (e.g. ‘physical’, ‘psychological’, ‘symbolic’, ‘epistemic’). Consequently, there is 121 
insufficient focus on the specific processes which actively encourage ‘smartly dressed armies 122 
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of civil servants’ in public-facing bureaucracies to perpetrate institutionally mediated acts of 123 
violence. 124 
To address this shortcoming, we draw inspiration from Bauman’s (1989) exposition of the 125 
psycho-social processes which facilitate ‘institutional violence’. While Bauman (1989) 126 
focused on a very unique case study—the Nazi genocide of European Jewish people 127 
between 1941 and 1945—he asserts that the ‘social mechanisms’ which brought about the 128 
Holocaust are ‘also set in motion under contemporary conditions’ and hence contain ‘crucial 129 
information about the society of which we are members’ (Bauman, 1989:95;xiv). As such, 130 
though we in no way seek to draw moral or historical equivalences between the Holocaust 131 
and the present analysis, we contend that Bauman’s analysis possesses a number of key 132 
insights that can be excavated and recalibrated towards original, critical interpretation of 133 
employment service delivery under the Coalition government’s reign. 134 
Bauman’s (1989:19-20; 184-5) analysis is founded on the proposition that ‘most of the 135 
perpetrators of the genocide were normal people’ and that humans instinctively possess a 136 
number of ‘primeval moral drives’—an ‘instinctive…animal pity’ (Arendt, 1963:106)—137 
pertaining to ‘inhibition against inflicting suffering on another human being, and the urge to 138 
help those who suffer’. As such, Bauman (1989:24) identifies two relational social 139 
mechanisms that were requisitely manufactured and harnessed by Nazi elites to suspend 140 
moral inhibition and transform masses of normal people ‘into murderers or conscious 141 
collaborators in the murdering process’. 142 
First, Nazi propaganda drew upon and enflamed centuries worth of anti-Semitic discourses 143 
to cultivate a hostile socio-political environment, constructing Jewish people as a ‘sinister 144 
and destructive’ political-economic threat to national security (Bauman, 1989:50). The 145 
political leadership’s language and rhetoric was fraught with images of the Jewry as an 146 
economically degenerative ‘parasite, a sponger who, like a pernicious bacillus, spreads over 147 
wider and wider areas’ and drains those who grant it hospitality (Hitler, 1925:253). 148 
Propagandists also devoted huge resources to mass media portrayals of Jewish people as a 149 
sub-population that rarely engaged in productive work and was 'always living off the honest 150 
toil of others' (Taylor, 1998:175-6). This dehumanised Jewish people as an ‘alien, hostile and 151 
undesirable’ other; worthy at least of disassociation, apathy and punishment in the eyes of 152 
German citizenry (Bauman, 1989:75).  153 
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Second, the Nazi’s mediated the action of violence against the Jewish citizenry, enabling the 154 
perpetrators to injure and kill their victims at greater ‘physical and/or psychic’ distances 155 
(Bauman, 1989:155; 24). This was not only accomplished through the promulgation of anti-156 
Semitic propaganda, but also through utilising many archetypal characteristics of the 157 
modern bureaucracy (see Weber, 1948). The Holocaust relied upon a top down hierarchical 158 
‘system of super- and subordination’ (Weber, 1948:197); whereby both scientific expertise 159 
and one’s immediate superior in the chain of command supplanted primeval moral drives as 160 
the principle source of moral authority. This ran in tandem with a ‘meticulous functional 161 
dissection and separation of tasks’ (Bauman, 1989:100). The practical effects of violent tasks 162 
were (mostly) ‘optically separated’ from the perpetrators’ vision via more clinical killing 163 
technologies (Bauman, 1989:194; 26); while each task was scientifically managed through 164 
quantitative (time and motion) monitoring and diagrammatic representation.  165 
Cumulatively, when violent acts were (1) morally sanctioned by authority, (2) broken down 166 
piecemeal and shielded from visceral response, then (3) numerically measured, according to 167 
Bauman (1989:159), the ‘moral concerns of the functionary [we]re drawn back from 168 
focusing on the plight of' those human objects of task performance. Instead, moral concerns 169 
were ‘forcefully shifted in another direction—the job to be done and the excellence with 170 
which it [was] performed’ (Bauman, 1989:159). It no longer mattered how the human 171 
objects fared; emotions were ‘marginal or altogether irrelevant to the task’ (Bauman, 172 
1989:188). The perpetrators forgot their violent actions were a means to something other 173 
than performing the immediate task at hand in satisfaction of quantitative criteria and a 174 
moral authority. Instead, they began to ‘occupy themselves with the rational task of finding 175 
better means for the given—and partial—end’, as opposed to the ’moral task of the 176 
evaluation of the ultimate objective’ (Bauman, 1989:195). 177 
Bauman’s analysis has been criticised (see Vetlesen, 2005). Some have disputed his 178 
argument that humans have innate aversions to violence; suggesting that his understanding 179 
of primeval moral drives is both ‘one-sided’ (e.g. neglects aggression instincts) and 180 
dismissive of the sociological orthodoxy that morals are ultimately a social product of 181 
cultural and historical processes (Vetlesen, 2005:47). And Bauman (1989:245) possibly 182 
contradicts his own analysis by later suggesting that it is ‘the civilising process’—that is, the 183 
historical development of social attitudes, standards and stigma against behaviours typically 184 
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associated with barbarism (see Elias, 1994)—which has fostered human aversion to 185 
violence. Nevertheless, his ideas on propaganda and bureaucracy remain a powerful way of 186 
explaining how ordinary people, raised in (late) modern societies, may commit 187 
institutionally mediated violence. 188 
Methodology 189 
All interviews were conducted in 2019 for a Vice-Chancellor PhD funded project examining 190 
contextualised agency in public service interactions between front-line employment service 191 
staff (n=11) and young male benefit claimants (n=15). The authors draw specifically on the 192 
responses of ten public and contractor employment service staff possessing direct 193 
experience of working in the employment service between 2010-15. One manager and 14 194 
claimants did not have relevant experience in this time period and have thus been excluded 195 
from the present analysis. A strength of the present sample was that these workers 196 
cumulatively had almost 200 years’ experience of working in the civil service. Some had 197 
witnessed first-hand several decade’s worth of social security reform: ‘It was different 198 
because in the '70s and '80s…It was more overall about the well-being…of a person’. The 199 
present sample also comprises workers occupying a variety of different roles: with one JCP 200 
manager; three JCP front-line staff; one JCP and later Work Programme front-line worker; 201 
one decision-maker, and four Work Programme front-line staff.  202 
All participants worked in different offices across the country (no two were the same). This 203 
reflected the continued difficulty of accessing employment service workers, the data 204 
protection regulations governing their experiences, and perhaps the DWP’s own increasing 205 
sensitivity to external scrutiny. This was most visibly revealed in its decision to rescind the 206 
involvement of Jobcentre Plus and Work Programme staff in a major ESRC-funded 207 
investigation of the impact of UK welfare reform (Welfare Conditionality, 2018:13). Many of 208 
those approached declined to speak citing fears around confidentiality (one in the present 209 
sample refused to be recorded). To overcome this, contact was established with retired civil 210 
servants and adjacent service providers where individuals had migrated into new roles. This 211 
reveals another possible limitation. The overwhelming majority of the sample (n=9) had left 212 
civil service at the time of interview. Nevertheless, we thought that this provided sufficient 213 
distance for many participants to provide thick descriptions of their experiences. This was 214 
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possibly reflected in the ease at which a ‘structure of feeling’ could be discerned across their 215 
individual experiences.  216 
Given some participants’ clear concerns around issues of privacy and confidentiality, as well 217 
as the sensitivity of some of the data revealed, we have opted to ensure all details of name, 218 
place, gender, age, ethnicity, job tenure and so forth are withheld or pseudonymised. 219 
Ethical approval for this research project was received by Sheffield Hallam University. 220 
The Production and Delivery of Institutional Violence  221 
The remainder of this article will outline the production and delivery of institutional violence 222 
in Britain’s network of public/contractor employment service offices. We begin by first 223 
showing how political and media elites combined to intensify forms of propaganda; 224 
constructing various benefit claiming groups as a drain on public resources to secure 225 
consent for austere reforms. Second, we illuminate the contours of post-2010 reforms to 226 
the operational logic underpinning Britain’s employment service bureaucracy. Finally, we 227 
draw upon primary qualitative data to reveal how core features of bureaucracy and 228 
propaganda operate on the ground and, at certain points, work in alloy, to produce ‘moral 229 
invisibility’ and encourage the delivery of institutionally violent practice(s).  230 
Welfare Propaganda: Cultivating a Hostile Environment 231 
The Coalition’s austerity programme took, in part at least, the symbolic ‘form of a massive 232 
propaganda exercise’ (Tyler, 2020:194). From 2008, pejorative, stigmatising portrayals of 233 
out-of-work populations became increasingly prevalent in political discourse (Okoroji, Gleibs 234 
and Jovchelovitch, 2020). Politicians intentionally rehashed and intensified centuries’ worth 235 
of ‘scrounger’ discourses to fortify anti-welfare common sense and manufacture consent for 236 
austerity (Morrison, 2019:8; Tyler, 2020:196). Britain was repeatedly described as broken 237 
under the threat of sexually excessive ‘parasites’ who breed ‘feckless families’ courtesy of 238 
the taxpayer (Atkinson, 2013), fraudsters in possession of an entitlement mentality 239 
(Duncan-Smith, 2012) and migrants placing increasing strain on public services and jobs 240 
(Vickers, 2019). 241 
Provocative political discourses tend to be widely shared in newspaper outlets and 242 
particularly by those sharing similar ideological orientations (Okoroji, Gleibs and 243 
Jovchelovitch, 2020:2). Consequently, this fuelled a huge surge in stigmatising terminology 244 
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through many mainstream British newspapers; reaching crescendo in 2013 (Morrison, 245 
2019:20-1). Not only did this bring about widespread dissemination of articles portraying 246 
migrant and out-of-work populations as a drain on public resources; but the digitalised, 247 
socially mediated methods through which these articles were disseminated enabled 248 
consumers to bolster narrative power by sharing, re-posting and adding further details or 249 
truth claims to the articles they interacted with (Morrison, 2019:201).  250 
This resulted in outbreaks of interpersonal violence upon migrant and benefit claiming 251 
populations (Burnett, 2017:220; Ryan, 2019:29). However, the main effects were a general 252 
hardening of public attitudes towards claimants and growing support for punitive measures 253 
(Okoroji, Gleibs and Jovchelovitch, 2020). According to one survey, the percentage of people 254 
agreeing that cutting welfare benefits would damage too many people’s lives had ‘fallen by 255 
17 percentage points’ from 59% in 2000 to 42% in 2010 (Taylor and Taylor-Gooby, 2014:6). 256 
Support ‘for more spending on benefits for disabled people unable to work fell 63% to 53%’ 257 
between 2008-11 (Park et al., 2012:ii). Meanwhile, 70% of 2,407 respondents in a 2011 poll 258 
felt that that people receiving unemployment benefits who refused job opportunities or 259 
failed to attend interviews should lose half or more of their claim (Adler, 2018:13). 260 
Consequently, Tyler (2020:197) concluded that propaganda spun around austerity 261 
‘transformed ways of seeing poverty, hardening people’s feelings to the suffering of those 262 
around them’, changing ‘how people related to each other, eroding structures of care, 263 
corroding compassion’. 264 
Social Security Reform: Manufacturing a Violent Bureaucracy  265 
A series of reforms to the operational logic driving Britain’s employment service 266 
bureaucracy were also implemented. Public and contractor employment service offices have 267 
operated under the archetypical logic of a modern bureaucracy since their modernised 268 
inception in the early 1900s (Price, 2000). Britain’s network of employment service offices 269 
has always tended to be monocratically organised and sensitive to government control. 270 
They operate on a top-down ‘hierarchical subordination’ model stretching from the 271 
Secretary of State in central government filtering all the way down to front-line service 272 
(DWP, 2019:110; Weber, 1948:197). Employment services have also always tended to 273 
possess a ‘rational character’ (Weber, 1948:244). This means that they tend to be staffed by 274 
officials who perform formal duties within a chain of command and in line with the 275 
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authority of more highly ranked officials above them (Wright, 2002:16). This also means that 276 
staff perform according to a set of ‘calculable rules’—customarily pertaining to policing 277 
benefit claims and matching local labour supply with demand (Price, 2000)—that serve to 278 
produce workers’ day-to-day ‘norms of conduct’ (Weber, 1948:215; 220).  279 
From 2010 onwards, the Coalition government radically altered this operational logic. This 280 
changed workers’ ‘norms of conduct’ and, in turn, transformed Britain’s network of 281 
employment offices into far more dangerous places for benefit claimants (Wright, Fletcher 282 
and Stewart, 2020). We contend that this was accomplished via three key (not exclusive) 283 
social security reforms.  284 
First, the Coalition engaged far more seriously with emerging scientific expertise on utilising 285 
policy tools to alter human behaviour (see https://www.bi.team/). In this vein, they built 286 
upon the ‘work-first’ foundations laid by previous administrations and introduced a rapid 287 
extension/intensification of existing behavioural change policy. The introduction of 288 
Universal Credit saw new groups subject to behavioural conditionality, while the 289 
introduction of a new Claimant Commitment also saw more claimant sub-groups subject to 290 
an intensification of work-related conditionality (Fletcher and Wright, 2018). Failures to 291 
comply were also punished under the rubric of an ‘enhanced sanctioning regime’. 292 
Introduced in 2012, the new regime featured a built-in tiered system of sanctions with 293 
longer disqualification periods (up to three years) for more serious non-compliance; 294 
differentiating between first, second and third violations to upscale punishment for 295 
recidivists (Adler, 2018:37). The Coalition’s sanctioning regime also featured a separate 296 
referral and decision-making mechanism; whereby front-line workers would initially raise a 297 
claimant non-compliance doubt and then refer the case with relevant evidence to an 298 
Independent Decision Maker who assesses the case according to specific legislative criteria 299 
in a separate office (see DWP, 2017). 300 
Second, the Coalition took inspiration from preceding Labour government experimentations 301 
and uprated investment in quasi-marketised employment services operating on a 302 
competitive, payment-by-results funding model—titled, ‘Work Programme’ (Wiggan, 2015). 303 
Unlike its predecessors, however, the Work Programme was targeted specifically at the 304 
‘hardest-to-help’ claimant populations (Finn, 2018). This required service providers to 305 
absorb risk and invest up-front, with profit largely dependent on their ability to secure initial 306 
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and sustained job outcomes for long-term unemployed people and those receiving 307 
illness/disability benefits subject to work-related requirements (Finn, 2018). The Coalition 308 
also explicitly mandated Work Programme providers to operate under the rubric of its 309 
newly enhanced sanctioning regime and make sanction referrals for any breach of 310 
requirements (Webster, 2016:2). Thus, front-line workers were not only managed according 311 
to a more stringent set of performance criteria centred firmly on job outcomes, but they 312 
also had a duty to refer claimants for sanction. This brought a wider range of some of the 313 
most vulnerable and least work-ready claimants under the ambit of a more stringent work-314 
related conditionality and sanctioning regime. 315 
Third, from 2010 there was an ‘unannounced change of policy by ministers…to pressurise 316 
DWP staff to make more referrals’ for sanctions (Webster, 2016:2) and, shortly after in April 317 
2011, a major simplification of the target regime governing front-line staff in Jobcentre Plus. 318 
Previously, worker performance was measured against a range of indicators, such as the 319 
proportion of claimants entering employment and the volume of adviser interviews (Finn, 320 
2018:226). By contrast, the new regime was to measure performance strictly according to 321 
‘off-benefit flows’—successful outcomes were now achieved when claimants ended their 322 
benefit claim, irrespective of whether they had entered employment (Finn, 2018:226). 323 
Fletcher and Wright (2018) suggest that largely hidden managerial pressure combined with 324 
Coalition’s new off-benefit flow target regime encouraged ‘the prioritisation of cases and 325 
actions’ that would ‘most quickly and effectively result in the termination of benefit claims’. 326 
Correspondingly, Webster (2016) claims that unannounced pressures and targets, alongside 327 
breaches of requirements with Work Programme providers above-mentioned, played a 328 
major role in inducing a huge increase in sanctioning rates between 2010 and 2013—329 
reaching over one million sanctions in 2013 and rising approximately 345% above their 330 
2001-08 average level (Adler, 2018:48). This also tallies with the DWP’s own decision to 331 
raise ‘it’s off-flow targets for jobcentres as part of its annual review of their performance’ 332 
and increase targets for those offices who were already ‘meeting them consistently’ in 2013 333 
(NAO, 2016:25). 334 
Moral Invisibility and Violence as Technique on the Front-line 335 
In 2013, skyrocketing sanction rates were accompanied by media concern; particularly by 336 
Guardian newspaper journalists who were openly hostile to the Coalition regime and 337 
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revealed documents that a secret regime of sanctioning targets existed within Jobcentre 338 
Plus (Couling, 2013:3). This prompted internal investigations to quickly deny the presence of 339 
sanctioning targets and/or the inflationary effects of off-flow targets on sanctioning rates 340 
(NAO, 2013). Neil Couling’s (2013:9) internal investigation ‘found no evidence of a secret 341 
national regime of targets or widespread secret imposition of local regimes to that effect’ 342 
and also ‘found no evidence people [were] being wrongly sanctioned as a consequence’. In 343 
contrast, the present research found clear evidence of secret, localised sanctioning regimes 344 
and clear indications that staff were inflating sanction referrals in at least three different 345 
Jobcentres situated across the UK. One worker reported: 346 
‘weekly team meetings. And s/he [team manager] used to produce a table which 347 
showed how many people you've sanctioned or how many people you'd 348 
referred to a decision-maker for a sanction.’ (JCP Executive Officer [worker 349 
three]) 350 
While the DWP explicitly denied the existence of sanctioning targets, mounting expectation 351 
to administer sanctions from above, translated into the formation and execution of local 352 
target regimes on the ground: ‘certain staff would come [in the canteen] and say "well I've 353 
got my [sanctions] target for the week”’ (JCP Executive Officer [worker seven]). It became 354 
clear that sanctioning and off-flow target regimes had a ‘dehumanising’ effect. For instance, 355 
manager one had witnessed the harsh realities of poverty and destitution experienced by 356 
out-of-work claimants s/he had worked with. Yet, this didn’t prevent them from pursuing 357 
sanctions and ‘off-benefit flows’. On the contrary, achieving targets was described as 358 
‘exciting’: 359 
‘it sounds sad doesn't it, but when the figures were coming out of what the 360 
unemployed were prior to Universal Credit, it was like exciting: “Oh God, what 361 
have we got today?” “How many have we got on the books?” “Has it gone down 362 
by hundreds?”’ (JCP Higher Executive Officer [manager one]) 363 
According to Bauman (1989:102), dehumanisation ‘starts at the point when…the objects at 364 
which the bureaucratic operation is aimed can, and are, reduced to a set of quantitative 365 
measures’. This makes it easier for workers to overlook the human consequences of their 366 
actions. In the present study, top-down managerial pressure—diagrammatically 367 
represented in the shape of sanctioning tables and off-flow targets legitimised by the moral 368 
authority of the democratic state—appeared to act as a ‘moral sleeping pill’ (Bauman, 369 
1989:26). This frequently made invisible the interests and moral demands of claimants in 370 
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the eyes of workers; sedating some from the possible outcomes of their actions and thereby 371 
allowing workers to view caseloads with ‘ethical indifference’ (Bauman, 1989:103). This was 372 
not only evidenced in competitiveness and enthusiasm around achieving targets—’you 373 
always wanted your team to be the best team’—often irrespective of their harmful 374 
outcomes (see later); but it was also evident in some respondents’ repeated attempts to 375 
‘demote, ex-probate and delegitimise the ethical motivations of social action’ (Bauman, 376 
1989:28). In this vein, respondents would sometimes absolve themselves of moral 377 
responsibility by assuring that they were ‘only implementing the law which made by MP’s 378 
which is voted by the people’ and that their actions were ‘not personal’, but driven by a 379 
superior moral authority: 380 
 ‘yes people [managers] did pull the wool over my eyes [with sanctioning 381 
targets]. I’ll quite freely admit it. I don't care, that's their conscience, not mine’ 382 
(worker seven) 383 
Moral sedation was also evident in the emphasis participants placed on remaining 384 
emotionally detached in the role: 385 
‘I think it's like you shut down the personal stuff, you're there to do a job…we 386 
can't become emotionally involved, can we?’ (manager one) 387 
It was also evident in the way some workers’ relinquished their political and moral ideals to 388 
the chain of command and the rules/procedures of the bureaucratic operation: ‘The way I 389 
was treated, I had to abide by these rules that went against everything I thought and 390 
believed in’ (Work Programme Welfare-to-Work Advisor [worker two]). When this occurs, 391 
according to Bauman, personal responsibility is divorced from action and the ethical motives 392 
of those carrying out the operation become superfluous. This creates a moral vacuum 393 
through which institutional violence can thrive. 394 
Moral sedation may also have been present in the way emotional detachment turned to 395 
‘disapprobation and censure’ when ‘resistance, or lack of co-operation’ on part of a claimant 396 
‘slowed down the smooth flow of bureaucratic routine’ (Bauman, 1989:103). Manager one 397 
revealed an instance where s/he used their relationship with a local employer to set a work-398 
resistant claimant up for a sanction: ‘one day, this particular man, I knew he didn't want a 399 
job, so I sent them to see this employer … I presume he got his benefit disallowed because 400 
he wasn't making himself available for work’. This could point to a limitation with the 401 
14 
 
application of Bauman’s ideas to the present case. It was possible that organisational 402 
conditions were not exclusively producing moral indifference. Some participants suggested 403 
that a small minority of colleagues throve on their legitimised ability to inflict harm: ‘you 404 
had some people who it seemed enjoyed the stick…it's like a power trip’ (Work Programme 405 
Welfare-to-Work Advisor [worker six]). 406 
Finally, moral sedation was evident in pre-occupations ‘with the rational task of finding 407 
better means for the given—and—partial end’; focusing ‘fully on the good performance of 408 
the job at hand’ and deploying ‘morally abject’ strategies to surpass targets (Bauman, 409 
1989:195; 102). In one JCP office, management had set up a team specifically to achieve 410 
benefit ‘off-loads’ (respondent terminology) within 0-13 weeks. According to worker three, 411 
because front-line staff were measured ultimately on ‘off-loads’, finding ways to sanction 412 
claimants and/or dissuade claims had become the more rational option. When asked how 413 
the 0-13 week team would achieve ‘off-loads’, worker three proceeded to explain how they 414 
would frequently treat claimants with ‘disrespect’ and use psychological harm as technique: 415 
‘they were pushing them until they either just cleared off because they couldn't take the 416 
pressure or they got sanctioned’ (cf. NAO, 2016:28). This chimed with worker five (JCP 417 
Executive Officer), who suggested that some staff intentionally tried to antagonise claimants 418 
in efforts to dissuade claims. 419 
Morally abject strategies to surpass targets were also evidenced in the case of one manager: 420 
‘who just thought s/he could get anybody sanctioned because they weren't 421 
complying. It didn't matter that they couldn't speak English. S/he misinterpreted 422 
the role to the point that s/he felt that the team would only be successful if they 423 
had an average amount of sanctions’ (worker seven) 424 
Worker seven proceeded to detail how claimants who did not speak English were often 425 
unable to evidence work searches in English but, as long as they had agreed to provide 426 
evidence in English, then they were liable for a sanction under the rubric of their 427 
Commitment: 428 
‘s/he would still insist that if they hadn't written in their Claimant Commitments 429 
themselves in English, that they should be sanctioned.…So they couldn't be 430 
applying for jobs. They couldn't understand that.’ 431 
Worker seven was expected to draw up Claimant Commitments with non-English speaking 432 
claimants on the stipulation that they would provide evidence of work search in English. 433 
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While this caused conflict on numerous occasions, worker seven’s manager proceeded to 434 
knowingly sign Commitments with claimants that s/he already knew would be highly 435 
unlikely to comply:  436 
s/he said to me, "you think I'm racist, don't you?" I said, "Well, I didn't say that”. 437 
I never said “racist”, but I said, “How can you stand there and tell me that if I'm 438 
speaking a different language to the person in front of me, I can penalize them 439 
because I can be sure that they've understood what I've said?” S/he said s/he 440 
would do that. That, that was right. S/he would do this Claimant Commitment 441 
and get them to sign it. So I said, “Well, I'm not going to sign it.” S/he said, “Well, 442 
I'll sign it.” So I said. “You're signing to say they've understood that?” “Well, 443 
they've signed it, so they must understand.”’ 444 
This case could indicate that racial bias was driving managerial behaviour; whereby non-445 
English speaking claimant lives were seen as less valuable and thus less deserving of fiscal 446 
support—perhaps indicating internalisation of heightened anti-migrant, racialized political 447 
and media discourse (Tyler, 2020). It could also reflect an effort to secure an ‘easy 448 
[sanctions] win’ (see Couling, 2013:15). Sanctions have to be referred to an independent 449 
decision-making process, which includes a right to appeal an adverse decision (for 450 
claimants). In relation to work-search related sanctions, decision-makers are explicitly 451 
mandated to legitimise sanction referrals in cases where claimants take work-search activity 452 
‘that does not offer them any chance of getting an offer of paid work’ as it ‘cannot help 453 
them satisfy the work-search requirement’ (DWP, 2017:64). As such, non-English speaking 454 
claimants were likely viewed as low-hanging fruit because their lack of cultural resources 455 
meant they could be readily penalised on this stipulation and are likely less able to 456 
legitimately challenge any adverse decision. It does not strain creditability to suggest that 457 
managers were actively probing for loopholes within the legislative framework to achieve 458 
sanctions. On the contrary, manager one was fully aware of the importance of working with 459 
the independent decision-making process in mind. Consequently:  460 
‘I used to send my staff to the decision-makers for training. We were particularly 461 
good at getting people off the books. It was usually because they were working 462 
anyway’ 463 
 464 
The ‘stigma power’ (Tyler, 2020) of pejorative welfare tropes often appeared in 465 
complementarity with the pursuit of off-flow and sanctioning targets. As can be seen in the 466 
excerpt above, by constructing out-of-work claimants as an undesirable and potentially 467 
threatening ‘other’ (e.g. as a ‘fraud’, ‘scrounger’, ‘drain’), staff could efface the humanity of 468 
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their caseloads and remove them from moral obligation. This provided some workers’ with 469 
a sufficient cause to justify punitive working practices which would likely lead to harmful 470 
outcomes: ‘s/he took the view that claimants are lazy, dishonest, not trying to get work and 471 
the stick was important’. In this vein, worker three explained how their manager made 472 
efforts to discipline workers and achieve sanctioning rates by harnessing ‘stigma power’ as a 473 
way of rousing antipathy among frontline staff and establishing distance between workers 474 
and claimants: 475 
‘there was a point at which s/he said, “It's your money! It's your taxes that 476 
they're living off! You know, you should be sanctioning them!”’ 477 
Stigma driven behaviour is not a phenomenon unique to the 2010-15 period. Nevertheless, 478 
for worker three, this period was somewhat unique in that stigmatising language was 479 
increasingly prevalent in formal communications meetings. This was reported to have a 480 
significant bearing on the frontline; ‘infecting the culture, practices and attitudes of welfare 481 
workers’ (Tyler, 2020:196): 482 
‘[it was] just work coaches sitting in the canteen at lunchtime saying how awful 483 
claimants were and how they were scroungers and liars and all the rest of it.’ 484 
Pejorative, stereotypical views of claimants were also present in the perceptions of some 485 
participants: 486 
Nowadays when you go a customer's house, they all have the big TV. I know it’s 487 
a stereotypical thing to say, but they do. Because that's what they do all day. 488 
They sit all day and they put Jeremy Kyle on’ (manager one) 489 
Stigma driven behaviour was also detected in the behaviour of G4S security guards who, 490 
according to worker seven, would sometimes intentionally try to antagonise claimants and 491 
‘make them feel uncomfortable’ through use of stigmatising language: ‘she said [in response 492 
to a claimant] “yeah, but at least I have a job to go to. Unlike you two.”… sometimes it's the 493 
other people that are about that will make the customer feel uncomfortable’.  494 
Similar processes were working to manufacture violent practices in Work Programme 495 
provider offices. Welfare-to-Work advisors frequently reported facing stringent managerial 496 
pressure—mediated through job outcome targets—to “push” mentally or physically 497 




‘[I had] a lovely guy who I really felt for who had mental health issues and the 500 
day after I had to reluctantly mandate him to something—he attempted suicide. 501 
I also had another lady who we pushed into work and it made her that ill she had 502 
a fit in her new job and was admitted to hospital.’  (Work Programme Welfare-503 
to-Work Advisor [worker nine]) 504 
Performance targets were of pivotal importance in governing behaviour (Soss, Fording and 505 
Schram, 2013). Worker six went on to describe how, in spite of ‘hav[ing] days where [s/he] 506 
would be in tears’ due to ‘forcing’ people into employment who ‘couldn’t even function you 507 
know on like a normal level’, a combination of job outcome targets and managerial 508 
pressure: 509 
‘made you feel competitive I think. I don't know why because I'm not like that 510 
this in role. It kind of made you really want to achieve, probably because you had 511 
a meeting every Wednesday with the whole team…It was very transparent on, 512 
you know, it would be highlighted the really good people…if people are getting 513 
flagged up for being great and then you don't. Like oh, you're going to know, I'm 514 
shit.’  (worker six [our emphasis]) 515 
This affirms the strength of applying Bauman’s ideas; revealing how moral inhibitions to 516 
violence and suffering were subordinated to competitive, target-focused behaviours that 517 
were driven by a desire to be seen as an economically productive, efficient and diligent 518 
worker in the eyes of colleagues and superiors. Worker six had recently moved into a new 519 
role working for a mental well-being, charity based employment service where achievement 520 
was not inextricably associated with job outcomes. This had transformed their behaviour; 521 
once again underscoring the crucial role performance metrics and managerial pressures play 522 
in shaping front-line practice.  523 
The 'moral sleeping pill' effects of performance metrics and moral authority meant that 524 
resistance to managerial pressure was uncommon. Nevertheless, our research uncovered a 525 
few instances of resistance. Evidently some workers felt it necessary to use discretion; 526 
creating minor spaces of personal control and autonomy by allowing some claimants to take 527 
‘small liberties’ (Dubois, 2010:151). Worker three was, for example, openly hostile to the 528 
UK's sanctioning regime which occasionally led to minor acts of subversion: 529 
 ‘If I don't think their job search is good enough, I might just ignore it’  530 
However, workers often had to justify their actions and could be subjected to further 531 
managerial pressure. This sometimes led to feelings of intimidation or fear which could 532 
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make it more difficult to resist managerial demands: 'I allowed myself to feel intimidated by 533 
this manager who criticised my lack of sanction' (worker three). Moreover, this could 534 
encourage staff to deliver the service in a more disrespectful and psychologically harmful 535 
way: 536 
'I've got my manager sitting there and they don’t come up with a good story 537 
about their job search…So I give them a bollocking…They [claimant] were 538 
exposing me as a softy…They were putting me at risk. So I was particularly angry 539 
about that.'(worker three) 540 
Conclusion 541 
We have demonstrated how ordinary workers have been encouraged to implement social 542 
security reforms which are frequently experienced as cruel and inhumane. We have sought 543 
to re-calibrate Bauman’s conceptual armature in an effort to make sense of the processes 544 
(or ‘social mechanisms’) which inform violent practice in UK employment services. In so 545 
doing, we have highlighted the pivotal role played by the (re)intensification of stigmatising 546 
welfare narratives and a number of social security reforms that changed the operational 547 
logic of Britain’s employment service under Coalition rule. These facilitated the production 548 
and delivery of institutional violence on the front-line of service delivery.  549 
Nevertheless, there are a number of key strengths and limitations of applying Bauman’s 550 
ideas to the operation of Britain’s employment service bureaucracy. In terms of the former, 551 
we have shown the relevance of notions such as ‘moral authority’ (in the shape of 552 
hierarchy/chain of command) and ‘quantitative measures’ (in the guise of sanctioning/off-553 
flow/job outcome targets) alongside heightened stigmatisation—which often worked in 554 
tandem—to produce a psychic distance between workers’ moral drives and their actions. 555 
This has been crucial in terms of paving the way for (institutionally) violent front-line 556 
practice.  557 
However, there are four key limitations to the application of Bauman’s ideas. First, social 558 
security reforms were not instituted to facilitate a genocidal outcome and consequently we 559 
did not detect any presence of clinical killing technologies on the front-line. This is 560 
important. The aim here has not been to simply transpose Bauman’s analysis of the 561 
Holocaust onto new conditions verbatim and we are not suggesting that the Coalition’s 562 
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austerity programme held a genocidal intent—although ‘social murder’ has been an indirect 563 
outcome of post-2010 reforms (Grover, 2019).  564 
Second, Bauman’s ideas are less relevant to contemporary employment service delivery. 565 
From 2015 onwards, policy makers have once again significantly altered the logic driving the 566 
employment service bureaucracy. Maximum sanctioning periods have recently been rolled 567 
back to six months from three years. Meanwhile, according to one active worker, the 568 
managerial message has shifted from policing claims and achieving off-flows to ‘focusing on 569 
Universal Credit and trying to get that to work’ with reduced staffing and resources: ‘it's 570 
changed now. It's completely disappeared in our office. There is no manager putting any 571 
pressure on us to sanction. There is no conversation in communication meetings which says 572 
claimants are lying scroungers’. This underlines the importance of political control over the 573 
purpose and operation of service delivery.  574 
Similarly, the new Work and Health Programme (replacing Work Programme) is still driven 575 
by job outcomes but with less emphasis on conditionality and sanctions and considerably 576 
more focus on the well-being of claimants than its predecessor. Sanctioning rates have been 577 
in significant decline and have fallen back to an average below their 2001 level. Some (not 578 
all) of the longer-term claimants spoken to in the present study even reported a change in 579 
service delivery: ’it seems like they've actually learnt a thing or two…it seems they've gone, 580 
we do actually need to take care of these people’. This not only points to the importance of 581 
conceiving of the employment service as a monocratically organised bureaucracy sensitive 582 
to government control; but, perhaps most crucially, that institutional violence is socially 583 
produced from above and is thus an ‘avoidable’ phenomenon (Grover, 2019:339). 584 
Third, Bauman’s theory as applied to the present case downplays the agency of employment 585 
service workers and the role of discretion in front-line practice (Lipsky, 2010). Although 586 
uncommon, we encountered staff that resisted managerial authority and refused to carry 587 
out their duties in a socially harmful way. However, resistance to sanctioning/off-flow 588 
targets was exceedingly difficult for workers, especially given that instruction through the 589 
chain of command was reported to firmly assert that sanctions ‘should be applied and are 590 
not a matter for individual discretion’ (Couling, 2013:9). 591 
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Finally, it is difficult to see how Bauman’s idea of optically separating the practical effects of 592 
violent tasks from the perpetrators vision is relevant to the present case; particularly as 593 
front-line staff are frequently confronted with the human consequences of their actions at 594 
subsequent face-to-face encounters with benefit claimants. It is salient to note that 595 
employment service staff were subjected to increased levels of verbal and physical 596 
intimidation from some claimants over 2010-15 (ES, 2013). 597 
However, the potential for institutional violence mediated through optical separation may 598 
become a more prominent feature of front-line service delivery. This is because the 599 
employment service bureaucracy is at a critical techno-economic juncture in its historical 600 
development. On the one hand, the roll-out of Universal Credit alongside persistent budget 601 
cuts in the last decade have fuelled a shift from inter-personal services towards more cost-602 
effective forms of digitalised service provision (Finn, 2018). By the time of full roll-out (now 603 
2024) over 80% of claimants will be expected to manage their interactions with the DWP 604 
online (Finn, 2018:225). Online service provision also features a ‘digitalised advisory 605 
function’ that allows Jobcentre staff to monitor individual job search activity and make 606 
sanction referrals for non-compliance (Finn, 2018:225).   607 
On the other hand, the employment service will soon have to reduce a persistently high 608 
claimant count resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. To this end, it has recently been 609 
announced that a major recruitment drive for new staff will take place but this will also 610 
intensify the shift toward more digitalised, socially distanced forms of service provision. 611 
Historical evidence has shown how institutional violence tends to thrive in periods of crisis 612 
management so as to dissuade claims and shift large numbers off the register (cf. Fox-Piven 613 
and Cloward, 1972). This was evident in reforms made during the Great Depression in the 614 
1930s (Fletcher, 2015) and again in response to the North American Financial Crisis (see 615 
above). Consequently, it is possible that the employment service will revert to reducing 616 
claims facilitated via more impersonal, digitalised forms of socially distanced service 617 
provision. Together, this may create a somewhat unique situation on the front-line. One in 618 
which workers are not only encouraged to dissuade claims via (institutionally) violent 619 
practice, but, for the first time ever, they are to do so online. Consequently, workers will be 620 
more optically separated from the human consequences of their actions than ever before 621 
and are thus increasingly shielded from the moral inhibitions that the consequences of any 622 
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violent action might ordinary evoke. It will therefore become more important than ever that 623 
research exposes the employment service bureaucracy to scrutiny in order to demystify 624 
front-line practices and uncover the human consequences of crisis management reforms. 625 
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